28 July 2009
This fact sheet has been developed to provide guidance to health care workers (HCWs) in the infection prevention and control management of suspected or confirmed cases with Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Flu Virus (H1N1 2009).
This Guidance is designed to help slow (mitigate) the transmission of this virus; it is expected that the infection prevention and control recommendations (particularly recommendations related to respiratory protection) may change as further information about the epidemiology (e.g., mode of transmission) and clinical course (e.g., mild or severe disease) of this virus is available and the outbreak evolves. In this document, a point of care risk assessment approach is used to guide decisions regarding the type of droplet precautions/respiratory protection to apply (Appendix A).
This guidance document is being provided by the Public Health Agency of Canada in response to the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Flu Virus outbreak. Please note that this document replaces previous guidance with respect to Guidance: Infection prevention and control measures for Health Care Workers in Acute Care Facilities of May 11, 2009. This guidance is based on current, available scientific evidence about this emerging disease, and is subject to review and change as new information becomes available. The following guidance should be read in conjunction with relevant provincial and territorial guidance documents. The Public Health Agency of Canada will be posting regular updates and related documents at www.phac-aspc.gc.ca. The content of this document has been informed by discussion with and technical advice provided by the Infection Control Expert Advisory Group to PHAC.
At this time the evidence suggests that the incubation period for H1N1 2009 is up to 7 days and individuals may remain infectious for up to 7 days. These timelines are similar to prior experience with human swine influenza viruses. Spread of H1N1 2009 has been almost exclusively in the community setting to this point, and this is where most exposures for the general public and health care workers alike will occur. The clinical picture to date of human illness from H1N1 2009 for most individuals is one of mild disease however, some will experience severe disease. H1N1 2009 is susceptible to the antiviral agents, oseltamivir and zanamivir, which represent therapeutic options for individuals in whom treatment is indicated. This information on morbidity and mortality and treatment options has been taken into account when updating this guidance. As noted above, as this virus spreads throughout the world, the clinical and epidemiological picture may change, requiring further modifications to this guidance. One goal of this revised guidance is, using a risk assessment approach, to support use of personal protective equipment most appropriate to the risk associated with the care to be provided, thereby protecting limited resources for those situations where protection is most needed.
The following criteria for influenza-like illness (ILI) can be used to determine the need for applying the infection prevention and control measures found in this guidance:
It should be noted that the ILI screening criteria above will also capture individuals who meet the criteria for severe respiratory illness (SRI). Individuals with SRI have chest radiograph findings of pulmonary infiltrates in addition to the screening criteria noted below. It should also be noted that these screening criteria above will be updated as the epidemiological situation evolves.
Until the etiology is known, in addition to Routine Practices, infection prevention and control measures in health care facilities for all ILI cases suspected or confirmed to be due to H1N1 2009 should include:
Routine Practices and Additional Precautions as outlined below are to be practiced with symptom(s) onset and until symptoms have resolved.
The importance of applying administrative and engineering controls as the first strategy in protecting the HCW from exposure to infectious agents in the health care setting cannot be overemphasized. Health care organizations should complete assessments of each area of all of their acute care facilities including physical settings (e.g. single rooms, use of partitions, ability to establish 2 metre distance between ILI cases and others), the types of patients seen, and the types of patient care activities undertaken. Based on these assessments, organizations need to determine what administrative and engineering controls are needed. This is especially important for patient care areas/settings where patients appear for initial assessment/investigation before a diagnosis of H1N1 2009 has been made.
In Emergency Departments (ED) and other acute assessment clinics (i.e. where patients present for assessment of new symptoms/illness) the following strategies are suggested:
Where there is a physical barrier:
If performing triage from an enclosed area and conducting the initial interview from behind a physical barrier (e.g., glass/acrylic glass partition), the HCW will not require any droplet precautions/respiratory protection.
Where there is no physical barrier:
If performing triage from an open area, where there is not a physical barrier, see #6 (Droplet Precautions/Respiratory Protection) to guide decisions regarding whether to use a mask1 or N95 respirator.
It should be noted that source control and practicing respiratory hygiene is often not feasible in paediatric patients.
In elective ambulatory care clinics (e.g. physiotherapy clinics, Well Baby and Well Woman clinics, outpatient follow-up clinics), where patients present for appointments:
Suspect ILI cases should be taught to perform hand hygiene (See #3 below).
Suspect ILI cases should also be taught how to perform respiratory hygiene practices (coughing into sleeve, using tissues, wearing a mask1).
Suspect ILI cases should wear a mask1 (if tolerated) when HCWs, or other staff or visitors are present.
HCWs should perform hand hygiene frequently (as per the healthcare organization’s policies) using either alcohol based hand rubs (60-90%) or soap and water.
Suspect ILI cases should be cared for in single rooms. If a single room is not available, patients with infection due to the same microorganism may be cohorted.
Place infection control signage on the room door indicating the precautions required.
Suspect ILI cases should only leave their rooms for medically necessary procedures; whenever a case leaves the room he/she should wear a mask1 if tolerated and be instructed on how to perform respiratory hygiene.
HCWs should wear gloves when entering the room of a suspect ILI case.
Gloves should be removed just before leaving the room and disposed of in a hands-free waste receptacle.
Gowns should be worn as per Routine Practices. When worn, gowns should be removed just before leaving the room and disposed of in a hands-free receptacle.
HCWs should use alcohol based hand rubs or soap and water after removing gown and gloves and after leaving the room.
HCWs should use droplet precautions/respiratory protection when within 2 metres of a suspect ILI case. The choice between droplet precautions (a mask1) and respiratory protection (N95 respirator) should be based on the following:
A mask1 should be worn:
Whenever a mask1 or N95 respirator is required, the HCW should also wear eye or face protection. Eye or face protection should be removed after leaving the case’s room and disposed of in either a hands-free waste receptacle (if disposable) or in a separate receptacle to go for reprocessing (if reusable).
The mask1 or N95 respirator should be removed by the straps, being careful not to touch the mask or respirator itself, after leaving the case’s room and disposed of in a hands-free waste receptacle.
HCWs should perform hand hygiene before and after removing the respiratory protection and after leaving the case’s room.
There is no indication for use of powered air-purifying respirators (PAPRs) in the care of a suspect ILI case.
HCWs should notify Infection Prevention and Control personnel in the acute care facility that a case with symptoms of ILI is being assessed. Infection Control personnel in the facility should notify Public Health of suspected or confirmed cases of H1N1 2009.
Note:
1 Surgical or high-quality procedure mask
2 Aerosol-generating Medical Procedures (AGMPs): any procedure carried out on a patient that can induce the production of aerosols of various sizes, including droplet nuclei. Examples include: non-invasive positive pressure ventilation (BIPAP, CPAP); endotrachial intubation; respiratory/airway suctioning; high-frequency oscillatory ventilation; tracheostomy care; chest physiotherapy; aerosolized or nebulized medication administration; diagnostic sputum induction; bronchoscopy procedure; autopsy of lung tissue.
References and Additional Information:
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