The following section addresses specific challenges and suggests some considerations for pandemic planning for RI communities and is not intended to replace advice provided in existing local, provincial or territorial plans and/or guidance documents.
Surveillance of influenza-like illness (ILI) in a RI community is important in order to monitor the entry or circulation of pH1N1 in the community, including the confirmation of an outbreak.1 Surveillance will also contribute to the evaluation of the effectiveness of antiviral treatment by identifying strains of the virus resistant to antiviral therapy. It is recommended that testing (nasopharyngeal swabs) be undertaken when patients are suspected to have an influenza-like illness if there is limited or no known transmission of the virus in the community. Once the pandemic strain is confirmed in a community, routine testing of patients other than those at high risk of developing a severe respiratory illness is not recommended.
Remote and isolated communities have difficulty getting timely access to influenza diagnostics because of infrastructure and transportation delays to reference laboratories. Although the performance characteristics of the currently available rapid antigen detection or Point-of-Care (POC) tests are poor, they may be the only option for diagnostic testing in remote communities and should be considered in planning for influenza.xix
When an outbreak of influenza is suspected, up to 10 patients presenting with ILI may be screened using these POC tests. The underlying premise has been that even with diagnostic tests of limited sensitivity, there was a high probability of detecting a flu virus in at least one specimen when 10 symptomatic patients in an epidemiologically linked cluster are tested. Finding such influenza would establish the presence of a flu virus in the cluster and hence allow for appropriate management of the outbreak.
Once the virus has been shown to be present in the community, further testing is not warranted except in patients that develop severe respiratory illness and require hospitalization. Likewise, testing is not required to determine the end of an outbreak. This should be self-evident by the fact that no further patients present with an ILI. If new cases of ILI should appear after the community has been free of ILI for a substantial time period (2-4 weeks), a second round of testing would be justified to investigate the return of influenza or perhaps a different subtype.
If specimens from a cluster of patients are tested and the virus is detected in one patient, the remainder are epidemiologically linked to this case and assumed also to have influenza. Patients presenting previously by 1-2 incubation periods that are epidemiologically linked would also be considered to have influenza.
If POC testing is used to assess influenza activity, it is advised that the test limitations be clearly understood and that sites train and educate healthcare professionals in order to optimize specimen collection and testing. The local public health laboratory can provide assistance in choosing and validating POC assays. If these tests are to be used, RI communities should make efforts to have a stockpile of these tests and appropriate swabs.
Regardless of whether POC testing is used, it is recommended that specimens from a subset of patients be forwarded to a reference virology laboratory to confirm the test results and to perform further testing such as determining the viral subtype and in some cases, resistance to antiviral drugs.
The national pandemic and flu surveillance system (FluWatch – see http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/fluwatch/index-eng.php) is being used to monitor the pandemic, adjust the response and guide future planning. There are FluWatch sentinel sites in several remote and isolated locations across Canada, with plans to expand the number of sites in the near future based on a pilot study conducted in Ontario. Information gathered at the health service level is an important component of the response and planning, and it is recommended that cases be reported to public health units through the usual processes. Additional surveillance resources, including fact sheets and tracking forms for school based ILI surveillance can be found in the Influenza Surveillance Guide for First Nation Communities, located at http://fnpublichealth.ca/h1n1/.
The national case definition for surveillance purposes is located at http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/alert-alerte/h1n1/hp-ps-info_definition-eng.php.
Surveillance of Oseltamivir Resistance:
To date, there have been isolated cases of oseltamivir-resistant pH1N1 viruses, including some in Canada, but these have thus far not resulted in a spread of resistant strains. In most of these cases, resistance developed during post-exposure prophylactic use of the antivirals in at-risk individuals. Ongoing monitoring of antiviral resistance is being conducted around the world. To date, these cases of resistance have not occurred in Canadian RI communities however, RI communities may seek guidance from their provincial public health laboratory regarding antiviral resistance diagnosis and surveillance.
RI Challenge: Difficulty obtaining surveillance data
Due to limited capacity in a RI community, privacy concerns of some First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples, and complicated reporting forms, there is difficulty obtaining surveillance data from RI communities.
Strategies to consider:
RI Challenge: Inconsistency with reporting.
Strategies to consider:
It is recommended that provincial and territorial guidance for clinicians be used by health care providers providing care to RI communities. Additional information, including clinical algorithms and tools, are located in Annex G (Clinical Care Guidelines and Tools) of the CPIP, however, some jurisdictional adaptations may be necessary and language barriers may exist. These may be addressed, for example, by employing trained cultural interpreters / translators for health care provider interaction (also for translating data collection forms and to explain forms and gather important surveillance information). For more information, refer to the Clinical Recommendations for patients presenting with influenza-like illness during the pandemic H1N1 (2009).
The following section addresses the stages of clinical assessment and treatment and the potential challenges faced by a health care provider in a RI community.
The objectives of triage are to identify suspected cases of pH1N1 for clinical management and to decrease the risk of transmission of the virus to patients and health care workers in health care facilities.
Public education may help people do their own personal self-assessment and thus reduce unnecessary strain on the health care system. Many jurisdictions are planning to implement special measures (e.g. initial assessment over the phone) to: determine whether a patient has influenza and can stay at home; to determine whether he/she needs to be seen by a clinician for further assessment; and to determine whether he/she may meet the criteria for early antiviral treatment, such as the criteria outlined in the algorithm at: http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/alert-alerte/h1n1/tools_outils-eng.php.
Many jurisdictions are using algorithms for use during telephone triage to determine whether or not a patient should be seen by a clinician. If it is determined that a clinical assessment is not needed at that time, the person may be given guidance on self-care measures and advice on when to contact a clinician again should symptoms worsen or persist. Suggestions for supplies people may consider stockpiling at home (e.g. symptom relief products) for self-care management are listed in Appendix A, and general advice for H1N1 preparedness at home can be found in Your H1N1 Preparedness Guide, available at: http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/alert-alerte/h1n1/guide/index-eng.php
It is recommended that all patients who present to a clinic or assessment centre be screened for cough and fever, ideally by the first person who is expected to have contact with the patient (i.e. a receptionist). If cough and fever are present, the patient may be instructed to clean his or her hands with a 60%-90% alcohol-based hand rub or soap and water, put on a surgical or high-quality procedure mask and if possible be seated at least two (2) meters (6-7 feet) away from others. Additional information on infection prevention and control in a RI community clinic setting is available in Guidance for Clinical Management of Patients with ILI in the context of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Remote and Isolated Communities
RI Challenge: Lack of access to culturally appropriate information
Public education for RI community residents that encourages personal assessment prior to accessing care may be challenging due to the lack of access to culturally appropriate information, and lack of telephone access in the home.
Strategies to consider:
Primary assessment includes history-taking (signs/symptoms, underlying medical conditions) and a physical examination with a focus on vital signs, mental status, the cardiorespiratory system and functional status.
Infection with pH1N1 results in influenza-like illness (ILI) similar to seasonal influenza. For the purpose of pH1N1, the following screening criteria may be used for patient assessment/triage and is based on evidence known to date:xx
ILI Screening Criteria for Clinical Purposes in the Context of pH1N1
* note, epidemiological data (from April-August 2009) showed that in laboratory confirmed patients: 100% of children under 2 presented with fever; 90% of pregnant women presented with fever; and 50% of people >65 presented without fever. Atypical presentations were most common in infants, the elderly and the immunocompromised.
RI Challenge: Nurses working in isolation
Nurses work independently in many RI communities and will likely need to make clinical decisions, possibly without a consultation.
Strategies to consider:
RI Challenge: Higher attack and severity rates
There is evidence for increased attack rates and a higher incidence of risk conditions for severe illness in RI communities. Many of these risk conditions may be undiagnosed.
Strategies to consider:
RI Challenge: Limited human health resources and care sites
There may be limited capacity in which to conduct clinical assessment in an existing health care facility in a RI community.
Strategies to consider:
Secondary assessment, if required, involves laboratory studies such as testing of nasopharyngeal swab specimens to further the assessment and evaluation of patients. However, once the presence of influenza in a community is established, the decision to treat or not treat should NOT be based on a point-of-care test result but rather on the clinical assessment and the patient’s underlying risk conditions. Advice regarding which tests may be considered are in Annex G (Clinical Care Guidelines and Tools) of the CPIP, located at http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/cpip-pclcpi/ann-g-eng.php, and relevant laboratory guidelines and nasopharyngeal swab protocol can be found in Annex C (Pandemic Influenza Laboratory Guidelines) of the CPIP, located at http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/cpip-pclcpi/pdf-e/annex_c-eng.pdf and the Interim Guidance for Laboratory Testing for Detection and Characterization of Pandemic H1N1 (2009) Virus.
As outlined above, RI communities have difficulty getting timely access to influenza diagnostics. For clinical decision-making, clinical assessment and the patients underlying risk conditions may drive treatment decisions. Although the performance characteristics of the currently available rapid antigen detection or Point of Care (POC) tests are poor, they may be the only option for diagnostic testing in RI communities. Given the very poor sensitivity (15%-60%) of these tests and the potential for false positive test results (especially if the tester is inexperienced), these tests are not recommended to make clinical decisions about diagnosis and treatment in individual patients.
Extreme temperature fluctuations and time delays in transporting specimens from RI communities may adversely affect laboratory test results (e.g. if a specimen is frozen and thawed, PCR testing may be falsely negative). It is advised that every effort be made to transport specimens without delay.
Guidelines for infection prevention and control, laboratory best practices and clinical assessment/management of people in a RI community is included in: Guidance for Clinical Management of Patients with ILI in the context of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Remote and Isolated Communities, located at http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/alert-alerte/h1n1/hp-ps/guideili-ldsg09-eng.php. It is recommended that specimens collected by clinicians in RI communities be collected and handled as per the recommendations in these guidelines.
RI Challenge: Delays in diagnostic results
Although it is generally recommended to collect a nasophyaryngeal swab on patients for surveillance purposes and may be warranted in certain clinical situations (e.g. patients with severe illness requiring hospitalization, for outbreak investigation), there may be delays in receiving test results. It is important that clinicians do not delay treatment decisions in suspect cases while awaiting laboratory results.
Strategies to consider:
After the pandemic has become established, contact tracing for surveillance purposes is not recommended. Due to widespread community spread of pH1N1 and to minimize the risk of antiviral resistance, close contacts2 are not routinely offered post-exposure antiviral prophylaxis (prevention). However, they may be educated and instructed to seek early treatment if they develop ILI symptoms.
RI Challenge: Overcrowding and isolation of cases
Generally, it is recommended to isolate cases from those who are at-risk and for sick individuals to keep a distance of two meters (6-7 feet) from others. This may be challenging in situations of overcrowding.
Strategies to consider:
Information for caregivers is included in Guidance: Looking after someone at home with H1N1 flu virus in a remote or isolated community.
2 Close contacts: having cared for, lived with, or had direct contact with respiratory secretions or body fluids of a probable or confirmed case of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (PHAC, H1N1 Flu Virus Case Report Form for Initial 100 cases, available at http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/alert-alerte/h1n1/pdf/hp-casereport-eng.pdf).
General advice regarding antiviral therapy is located in Annex E (The Use of Antiviral Drugs During a Pandemic) of the CPIP. Additional advice on the clinical management of patients in a RI setting is located in Guidance for Clinical Management of Patients with ILI in the context of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in a Remote and Isolated Communit.
Advice on outbreak management in a remote and isolated community is located in Guidance for the Management of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Outbreaks in Residential Facilities in Remote and Isolated Communities.
While not all individuals in RI communities are considered more at risk for influenza complications, it is recommended that the treating clinician be aware of what can place individuals at a higher risk (e.g. underlying chronic medical conditions, pregnancy, children less than 5 years of age), which can in turn impact the need for investigation and clinical judgment.
Experience thus far with the pH1N1 outbreak supports early assessment and treatment of those in the general population with ILI who are at-risk of complications to reduce overall morbidity and mortality. Due to the circumstances in a RI community, it is recommended that early treatment be considered for those with ILI regardless of disease severity or underlying medical conditions. Should a patient be placed on antiviral therapy and is not responding well, antiviral resistance could be suspected and discussed with local public health authorities.
RI Challenge: Availability of Antivirals
The availability of antivirals in a RI community may be impacted by transportation and weather issues which could delay the initiation of early (within 24-48 hours of symptom onset) treatment.
Strategies to consider:
RI Challenge: Limited access to Tamiflu® suspension
RI communities may have limited access to Tamiflu® for oral suspension for those unable to swallow capsules or for paediatric doses where paediatric capsules are no longer available. The Tamiflu® Product Monographxxii provides instructions for pharmacist-preparation of oral suspension; however, there may not be a pharmacist available in a RI community to reconstitute the drug.
Strategies to consider:
† Roche Canada. (July 2009). Tamiflu product monograph. Retrieved from www.rochecanada.com
Reporting Adverse Events to Antivirals in RI Communities
For more information on Adverse Events see the Health Canada document entitled Reporting Adverse Reactions to Antiviral Drugs during an Influenza Pandemic – Guidelines for Health Professionals and Consumers.
As challenges to reporting are recognized especially in RI communities the following three methods are acceptable ways to report adverse events.
Alternatively, the Canada Vigilance Reporting Form can be sent by postage paid mail. The form and postage paid label are available at www.healthcanada.gc.ca/medeffect
or by calling 1-866-234-2345. The adverse reaction reporting form is also available for health professionals at the back of the Compendium of Pharmaceuticals and Specialties (CPS).
Access to an acute health care facility is a particular challenge for RI communities. In some instances, it may be necessary to transfer a patient to an acute care facility because of the severity of symptoms, the extent of care required and the capacity to provide this care, and/or a lack of appropriate medical equipment and services (e.g. ventilators, oxygen therapy).
RI Challenges: Transportation issues
Limited flights (e.g. infrequency of flights, unavailability of pilots for Med-Evac due to illness) or inclement weather make the transfer of critically ill patients from a RI community more challenging.
Strategies to consider:
Diversities exist in health care service delivery in RI communities and may be considered when developing pandemic influenza strategies. Several types of professional and non-professional health care workers provide services in RI communities. Additional advice on health service planning can be found in Guidance for Health Services Planning in Remote and Isolated Communities.
RI Challenges: Lack of human capacity
Existing shortages of staff and the absence of surge capacity present a significant challenge in RI communities. Existing limitations to human resources could be exacerbated during a pandemic by illness-related absenteeism and personal and/or family responsibilities.
Strategies to consider:
RI Challenges: Lack of availability of clinic supplies
Due to geographical location and weather conditions, there may be challenges with regard to availability of clinic resources (e.g. personal protective equipment, symptomatic relief supplies, oxygen) in RI communities.
Strategies to consider:
RI Challenges: Limited controlled and secure storage capacity
Due to the potential for limited controlled and secure storage space in a RI community, challenges may arise with the appropriate care and control of stockpiled emergency supplies.
Strategies to consider:
National guidance on the pH1N1 vaccine is available at http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/alert-alerte/h1n1/vacc/pdf/monovacc-guide-eng.pdf. The Pandemic Vaccine Prioritization Framework offers information which was helpful in the development of recommendations for who should have early access to vaccine, or to identify those who would benefit the most. At this time, pandemic H1N1 vaccine is available to all Canadians who want it. In delivering vaccine programs in a remote and isolated community, it is the operational details that present challenges.
RI Challenge: Delayed delivery of vaccine
Delivery and transportation of vaccine in RI communities can be challenging due to inclement weather. This can also impact cold chain.
Strategies to consider:
RI Challenge: Managing adverse reactions to the vaccine
Those with potential for adverse reactions (e.g. egg allergies, previous reaction to a vaccine) in a RI community may not wish to be (nor would it be recommended that they be) vaccinated in that setting due to the challenges associated with managing an anaphylactic reaction in a RI setting.
Strategies to consider:
RI Challenge: Lack of human resource capacity to vaccinate
Mass vaccination of RI communities may be operationally difficult due to lack of capacity for vaccination clinics while maintaining normal services, additional immunization campaigns and surge needs in the fall.
Strategies to consider:
RI communities are at risk of influenza outbreaks due to multiple factors (e.g. environmental conditions) predisposing to transmission. In these settings, even in the absence of confirmed cases, it is important to minimize the impact of possible rapid spread. It is recommended that early outbreak investigation and management be considered in consultation with the local public health unit. Community-based public health measures, such as voluntary self-isolation for ill persons, travel advisories and, if necessary, school closures and cancellation/postponement of public gatherings may be considered, depending on the local circumstances. Guidance on schools, daycare and camp closures can be found at www.phac.aspc.gc.ca along with public health measures in the national guidance document entitled Individual and Community Based Measures to Help Prevent Transmission of ILI in the Community, including the Pandemic Influenza (H1N1) 2009 Virus. In addition, guidance for caring for an ill person at home can be found in Guidance: Looking after someone at home with H1N1 flu virus in a remote and isolated community.
RI Challenge: Lack of availability of non-medical supplies
Delivery and transportation of non-medical supplies (e.g. soap, food, household items, etc.) in RI communities can be challenging due to limited transportation, possible illness in the household, and other factors such as inclement weather.
Strategies to consider:
RI Challenge: Limited access to running water
Unlike most urban communities in Canada, some RI communities have limited access to clean running water for hand hygiene. Existing hand washing guidelines assume that there is access to clean running water.
Strategies to consider:
RI Challenge: Public gatherings
The potential for spread of infection during public gatherings may put undue strain on already limited resources in RI communities.
Strategies to consider:
RI Challenge: Impact of school closures
School closures in RI areas may have a significant impact on a community. Given limited qualified substitute staff in the community, the school may not be able to implement a business continuity cycle if there is a high attack rate. Hence, the school closure may be longer than in urban communities.
Strategies to consider:
RI Challenge: Potential lack of tailored public health awareness campaigns
RI communities may not be exposed to the same degree as urban communities to public health awareness campaigns. In addition, the messaging that RI communities receive is often not suited or tailored to the circumstances (e.g. limited water, limited accessibility to supplies) in these communities or considerations given to health literacy, language barriers and limited access to telecommunications including basic phone and internet.
Strategies to consider:
Although to date there has not been widespread severe illness and death due to pH1N1, there exists the possibility that extensive social and economic disruption and death could occur. Annex I (Guidelines for the Management of Mass Fatalities During an Influenza Pandemic) of the CPIP, provides information on the special religious and ethnic considerations related to the management of bodies after death, with information on particular issues that RI communities could encounter in dealing with large numbers of fatalities.
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